In Warsaw, NATO military leader sets out his strategy to defeat any attack

The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, presented Monday, October 12, 2026, at the Warsaw Security Forum, a strategy to prevent an aggressor from achieving his goals against a NATO member. His commitment: to make any attack "totally useless". The reports of Euronews, RTS and L It is a military objective, not demonstrated effectiveness in combat. [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5]

Block, weaken, then break the aggression

The heart of this approach lies in three English verbs: "block, bluet, break". First, allied forces must block the initial attack and prevent the seizure of territory. If the offensive continues, they must reduce its power and stop its progression. Finally, if the adversary persists or commits its reserves, NATO intends to neutralize not only the attacking units, but also the means by which they can continue to fight. Euronews and Reuters converge on this sequence. [S1] [S5]

This last step is a central element of the message: the answer would not be limited to troops present at the scene of aggression. It would also target their command structures, supply networks and support capabilities. Reuters highlights the scope of this warning, while Euronews details the envisaged role of long-range precision strikes and sensor networks. However, the specific scope of such operations is not specified in these reports. [S1] [S5]

According to Euronews, the plan, approved by the 32 members of the Alliance, combines conventional forces, drones, anti-drones and artificial intelligence. The general also highlighted the lessons learned from the fighting in Ukraine. These elements complement the message of deterrence: the ambition is to coordinate conventional military capabilities and new technologies to prevent the adversary from continuing its offensive. [S1]

Reassuring allies and warning Moscow

The intervention is aimed at two audiences. To the allies, Grynkewich claims that NATO is ready to fight if attacked. To potential opponents, he announces that an attack would not achieve the desired gains. The Express places particular emphasis on the desire to reassure Europeans about American engagement; Euronews reports that the General invoked the principle of collective defence and Washington's commitment to Article 5. [S1] [S3]

Reuters states that Grynkewich did not name Russia in his speech presenting this strategy, while interpreting his warning as clearly intended for Moscow. The same reading is offered by L-Express. This interpretation must be distinguished from its explicit statements on hybrid actions: in these, reported by the RTS and 20 Minutes, it calls on the allies to communicate to Russia their red lines in a clear and concise way. [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5]

A deterrence that does not herald an imminent war

The firmness of the discourse is accompanied by a desire to limit the risks of misunderstanding. According to the RTS, the general neither considers an imminent nor inevitable conflict and insists on maintaining channels of communication with Moscow. Euronews also reports that it presents this strategy as strictly defensive, without territorial ambition beyond the protection of allied populations and territory. [S1] [S2]

The context remains that of accusations of sabotage, drone incursions and cyber attacks against Moscow by European governments. These so-called hybrid actions are mentioned in the margins of the strategy against military aggression. However, the reported statements do not set a public and precise threshold for determining the response to each type of incident. Rather, they emphasize consultation between allies and the clarity of the signal sent. [S2] [S4] [S5]

Public principles, modalities not yet detailed

There is still a difference in vocabulary between the sources: Euronews uses "Theory of War", while RTS, L-Express and Reuters speak of "theory of victory". The reported content nevertheless converges on the same defence logic in three stages. The items consulted do not provide a detailed deployment schedule or a costed inventory of requirements. The promise to render an attack futile must therefore be understood as a declaration of deterrence and operational readiness, not as a guarantee of defence without loss or difficulty. [S1] [S2] [S3] [S5]